[editor’s note (That’s me, Robin, the son)… In the summer of 1990, while visiting my parents at their Florida townhouse, my dad suggested we go for a drive. We stopped in at a strip mall and walked right through a furniture store to an office in the back. That’s where I met Heine Aderholt mentioned in the attached letter. My dad addressed him as “Sir” and explained that I had been asking about his first assignment in “Southeast Asia” and that he didn’t know what he could tell me. I was really confused as my dad made no mention of the day’s plans. Heine was clearly glad to see my dad and said in his gravely voice, “You can tell him whatever the f*** you want. Sit down and let’s talk.” Then, just like a movie, Heine reached for the whiskey and glasses at the ready in his bottom desk drawer. Heine and my dad proceeded to tell me the story contained in the letter linked below.]
I have been wrestling with how to release to the public a short but interesting happening during my AF career. Richard Gobel found this article by searching the Internet, which tells the story of how I became a mercenary in the spring of 1961 and what we did during that spring and summer. I was part of project “Mill Pond”, there is much more information and history in the article than just “Mill Pond” but it covers that period pretty well, so I won’t try to improve it. Thank Richard for finding it because I don’t think I would have published this if he hadn’t. Thanks Dick… Bob
http://www.utdallas.edu/library/collections/speccoll/Leeker/history/Laos3.pdf
or download this copy:
Here is page 1 and page 2 [editor’s note: my dad is listed in note 8 on page 2]…
Air America in Laos III – in combat
by Dr. Joe F. Leeker
Last updated on 23 August 2010.
When, in May 1987, during the unveiling of the Air America Memorial at UTD’s McDermott Library at Richardson former CIA director William Colby said that Air America aircraft were not combat aircraft, but transport aircraft, that was only true for most of Air America’s flights. But in at least three programs Air America crews flew or were to fly combat aircraft in Laos: B-26s in Projects Mill Pond and Black Watch in 1961 and T-28s as A-Team pilots for the Tango program. Already in July 1955, 2 C-47s chartered from CAT had participated in the first post-ceasefire combat jump flown by C-47s of the ANL (Armée Nationale Laotienne or Lao National Army), when the aircraft dropped the ANL’s airborne battalion, the Seno-based 1er Bataillon de Parachutistes, over the garrison of Moung Peun beleaguered by Pathet Lao forces.1 Then there was another absolutely unofficial use of Air America transport aircraft as
bombers dropping “Hot soup”. Finally many Air America aircraft flew combat support missions that brought them very close to the actual fighting: This was true for many missions flown by Air America’s helicopters, that is by the UH-34Ds assigned to the Madriver-contract and later especially for the Bells and S-58Ts assigned to the AID-439-713 contract; these helicopters were often used in missions that used the “Leapfrog technique”, transporting small groups of soldiers from one point of a battlefield to another. Other helicopters like the Chinooks would carry big guns to their actual positions. Other combat support flights made by Air America aircraft were Forward Air Controller missions (Butterflies) made before the arrival of the Ravens, and especially during the later years of the war, dropping paratroopers from aircraft like the Twin Otters assigned to contract AID-439-713.
Laos 1961: Project Mill Pond:
As the Soviet Union made no attempt to conceal its airlift of arms and ammunition to Kong Le, US President Eisenhower approved an expanded program of CIA responses. Reportedly, already in December 1960, the CIA secretly flew four black B-26s, probably left over from Operation Haik, from CEECO stocks at Tainan to Takhli und placed them under Major Aderholt’s command.2 But probably, only 2 B-26s were ferried to Takhli at that time. On 7 January 61, 2 more B-26s were ordered to Takhli, but had not yet arrived by early March 61.3 “On March 21 [1961], Jenny, Beale, Sutphin, and Barnes ferried heavily armed B-26s to Takhli”4 – probably the remaining 2 black B-26s. Originally, the aircraft were to be used for
air strikes against the center of Pathet Lao support at Vang Vieng, but although Detachment 2 had the bombers ready to go, all air strikes were called off. Then, the target was to become the Plain of Jars. The loss of the critical junction of Routes 7 and 13 at Sala Phou Khoun in early March 1961 had several consequences: The US Government felt it might be necessary to defend the neutral and independent Laos, and so on 9 March 61, President Kennedy approved plans for a major B-26 strike against the Plain of Jars,5 as the only Laotian combat aircraft at
1 Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, p.16.
2 Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, p. 45.
3 Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, pp. 48 + 52.
4 Interview with Thomas G. Jenny, conducted by Prof. William Leary at Atlanta, GA on 24 May 1988, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/I B13F7. This is not evident from Tom Jenny’s log book, which notes only 2 B-26s (“6797” and “8264”) test flown at Tainan for one hour each (Tom Jenny kindly sent photocopies of his log book
5 Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, p. 51
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that time were four armed T-6s received from the Royal Thai Air Force in early January 61.6 Major Aderholt was charged to work out the requirements of such a task force for an attack to be carried out on 17April 61, within hours of the Cuban invasion.7 On 19 March 61, a vast mobilization of US forces in the Pacific was ordered, and on 29 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a multinational contingency force for Laos. So, in March and April 61, a total of 18 USAF pilots,8 all volunteers, were discharged from the USAF, given civilian clothes and fake identification, and flown to Takhli, Thailand, home of Project Mill Pond, where they were given Royal Laotian Air Force commissions. One of them, Ronald L. Allaire, describes his experience as follows: “I was sent to a hotel in Washington, D.C. where I took a battery of tests […] Afterwards I was sent to the Pentagon to be interviewed by a small number of 6 The Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) at Thailand had offered the Royal Thai Government five T-37s in exchange for Thai-owned T-6s to be transferred to US control and then given to Laos. On 3 January 61, four Lao pilots arrived at Kokethiem, Thailand, and after some days of training, the Lao, including detachment leader Major Thao Ma, on 9 January 61 ferried the 4 T-6s to Savannakhet and then to Vientiane on 10 January for their first mission. By early February 61, the RLAF had received 8 T-6s, but not enough pilots, so that 4 Thai volunteer pilots were selected from the RThAF’s 63rd Squadron of Don Muang. One T-6 was shot down over Sala Phou Khoun on 17 January 61, one T-6 crashed during a training flight on 11 January, two T-6s collided in midair during operations near Tha Thom on 12 January 61, and one T-6 received ground fire and crash-landed near Tha Thom on 31 March 61 (Conboy / Morrison, Shadow war, p. 46, note 52, p. 48, and pp. 50/1).
7 This chapter is mainly based on the excellent description contained in: Hagedorn / Hellström, Foreign
Invaders, pp. 132-36; Trest, Air Commando One, p.110.
8 Ronald L. Allaire, Wilson S. Decker, Claude W. Gilliam, Chester Golka, Guy W. Grosse, Richard T. Hardy, William J. Healey, J. William Ingeman Jr., Clarence T. May, Robert A. Maiden, Matt O’Hare, Howard L. Naslund, Earnest C. Parker, Gary C. Prickett, John R. Rowland, Arthur D. Smith, Harold T. Stubbs, and James E. Wright (Letter dated 25 Sept.1990, written by R. L. Allaire to William M. Leary, preserved at: UTD/Leary/ I to the author on 22 October 2004). Probably he was not allowed to log the ferry flight.
Continue reading by downloading the PDF: Laos3